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I further discuss the recent changes in Japanese corporate governance and provide 
theoretical explanation that they do not necessarily enhance board monitoring
Keywords: Board Monitoring; Distortion of Bargaining Surplus; Japanese Corporate 
Governance; US Corporate Governance; Board Size
JEL Codes: G30, K22, P51
The Australian National University Email: meg.sato@anu.edu.au
† I am truly grateful to Kazuya Kamiya, Hideshi Itoh, Richard Anton Braun, and 
Harrison Cheng for their invaluable comments and suggestions which had made 
enormous difference to me. I would especially like to thank Hideshi Itoh and Kazuya 
Kamiya for reading this paper over and over and giving me helpful advices. I truly 
appreciate Trevor Wilson for reading this paper and giving me helpful comments. 
I also appreciate comments from an anonymous referee. I am responsible for any 
errors.
This article was the joint winner of the Australia-Japan Research Centre’s Crawford 
Award in 2009.
1 Introduction
This paper attempts to provide a theoretical explanation for why Japanese corporate 
boards can function as an effective monitoring device even though they have only few 
or no outside directors and a CEO is normally appointed through internal promotion.   
Until recently, corporate boards in Japan were not considered as a primary monitoring 
device, and hence not much research has been done on them. That is, within Keiretsu, 
main-banks and cross-shareholding companies were considered to function as oversight 2
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for management. However, as main-banks and cross-shareholdings became less common 
in Japanese corporate practices, the device to which stakeholders entrust monitoring of 
management has become vague. Therefore, this paper focuses on the board of directors 
and analyses the conditions which it can effectively monitor the CEO. 
  Japanese corporate governance has two distinct features. First, there is no legal re-
quirement to have outside directors on corporate boards.1 Thus, many boards are comprised 
almost entirely of inside directors who either started work as low-rank employees of the 
company, but have become directors of the company after several successful promotions.2   
Second, it is common that a new CEO is chosen from one of these inside directors.3 Hence, 
directors are given an incentive to work hard to become the next CEO of the company 
(that is, to be nominated by the incumbent CEO), while one of their mandatory roles is 
to monitor the incumbent CEO.4  In short, directors trade-off becoming the incumbent 
CEO’s friend versus becoming a watchdog. Thus, while internal promotion from director 
to CEO may provide an incentive for inside directors to work hard (Lazar and Rosen 1981; 
Rosen 1986; Chan 1996; and Agrawal et al. 2006), it may weaken board monitoring since 
directors may not wish to threaten their friendships with the CEO, or in the worst case, 
to be ousted from the board (Warther 1998).
  In this paper, I am going to show that despite above characteristics, Japanese 
boards are capable of monitoring CEOs  by building a theoretical model which allows us 
to compare Japanese corporate governance (J-system) and the US corporate governance 
(A-system) where boards of listed companies are required to have independent directors 
under the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ rules.5 The model is built 
on Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). 
  In  Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1998),  the  incumbent  board  (treated  as  a  single 
player) and the incumbent CEO determine the wage of the incumbent CEO and a new 
director to be appointed to the board through Nash bargaining. This new board with 
the new director can be regarded as a different board from the incumbent board. Then, 
after the Nash bargaining stage, this new board monitors the incumbent CEO.6 Thus, 
the incumbent CEO is willing to compromise his/her wage in exchange for appointing 
a new director who is likely to be loyal to him/her. Their main finding is that when the 
CEO is involved in appointing a new director, someone who is less independent from the 
CEO is appointed and weakens board monitoring of the CEO. They measure this with 
notation ki : the board’s lack of independence, where it changes from k0 (exogenously 
given) to k1 (endogenously determined), (k0 < k1), as the board members change. This ki 
can be interpreted as a measure of comradeship or allegiance to the CEO, and they argue 
that the higher is ki (or the stronger the comradeship or allegiance to the CEO is); the less 
the board monitors the incumbent CEO. In short, the monitoring level and the board’s 3
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measure of lack of independence have one-to-one correspondence, and it can be regarded 
that the incumbent board and the incumbent CEO are the players that are determining 
the monitoring level.
  In this paper, the monitoring level and the wage of the incumbent CEO are deter-
mined together in the negotiation between the incumbent CEO and the incumbent board. 
The incumbent board is either composed solely of insiders who are all CEO candidates 
(J-system), or composed solely of outsiders who are regarded as those who do not have 
an incentive to become the successor CEO (A-system).7 There are two major differences 
between this paper and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). For one, this paper extends their 
model to explain the rationale for the J-system and allows a comparison of monitoring 
levels between the J-system and the A-system, while their paper provides a theoretical 
analysis on how the endogenously chosen board of directors becomes less independent of 
CEO under a system in which a new CEO is recruited from outside the board (which is 
referred to as ‘A-system’ in this paper). Second, while their paper focuses on inefficiencies 
created through a change in the board’s lack of independence (from k0 to k1), this paper 
focuses on inefficiencies that occur regardless of the board independence for both the J-
system and A-system.  In other words, I show that regardless of the CEO appointment 
policy and the board’s lack of independence, inevitable inefficiencies (namely, ‘distortion’, 
explained in the next paragraph) arise when the incumbent board and CEO have the say 
in determining the new board member, and this weakens board monitoring intensities.8 
  I show that the equilibrium monitoring level is higher under the J-system than 
under the A-system, because negotiations held under the J-system exhibit less distortion 
of the expected surplus to be divided among the negotiating parties (the incumbent CEO 
and the incumbent board). Specifically, determining the monitoring level is synonymous 
with determining the probability of replacing the incumbent CEO with a new CEO, 
which brings in a new executive (newcomer) to the firm. This implies that a fraction of 
the Nash bargaining surplus will be given to this newcomer who did not exist when the 
negotiation was taking place. Note that there are two possible cases for the newcomers. 
When the board recruits the CEO from outside as in the A-system, the newcomer is the 
new CEO. When the board promotes one of the incumbent directors to the CEO as in 
the J-system, the newcomer is then the new director who is hired to refill the board.9 The 
incumbent executives agree to keep the incumbent CEO, if they believe that the amount 
of surplus which will be given to the newcomer exceeds the additional profit the new CEO 
will bring to the firm. In this paper, the new CEO is assumed to bring the same amount of 
additional profit regardless of whether s/he is from inside or outside the board.10  Thus, 
the J-system exhibits less distortion than the A-system, for the fraction of surplus to be 
given to the new director (a lower ranked executive) is smaller than the fraction given to 4
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the new CEO (a high ranked executive). 
  I also argue that, if this is the case, why Japanese boards are not functioning as ef-
fective monitoring device. I find the answer in life-time employment where they promote 
low-ranking employees to the posts of executives as the cause of low monitoring (less 
CEO turnovers) in Japanese firms. Note that this type of internal promotion (employee to 
executive) must be distinguished from the internal promotion from low-ranking executive 
to CEO. In short, life-time employment allows employees to work in the same company 
for a long time, and it creates strong friendships or bonds among the employees, resulting 
in higher k0 in the J-system than in the A-system.
  The insight this paper provides goes beyond a comparison of two corporate govern-
ance systems. That is, it gives another implication to the finding of Agrawal et al (2006). 
They point out that firms promote insiders internally to become CEOs either because 
insiders have acquired a firm-specific knowledge, or they give insiders an incentive to work 
hard. However, it could be that firms internally appoint new CEOs in order to minimise 
the distortion of the bargaining surplus among the incumbent management group. 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides some specifics 
on the model structure common to both governance systems. Section three discusses the 
A-system, and section four the J-system. Section five discusses the efficiency of the recent 
legal reforms on Japanese corporate governance. Section six concludes.
2 Model
There are two players: the board (whose members act as a single player) and incumbent 
CEO. The theoretical setting is a Nash bargaining game in which these two players nego-
tiate over two issues to be written on the contract; the wage of the incumbent CEO and 
a choice of a new director to be appointed to the board (which affects board monitoring 
intensity). I show that when these two players (the incumbent executives) determine the 
above issues, inefficiencies arise regardless of J-system or A-system, and weakens board 
monitoring intensities. However, negotiations held under the J-system exhibit less distortion 
of the expected surplus to be divided by the incumbent executives, and thus the J-system 
produces more monitoring than the A-system.
2.1 Timing
The model consists of four stages, as follows. The incumbent board’s measure of lack of 
independence k0 is exogenously given. The number of directors n is given exogenously 
in this section, but I endogenise it in the Appendix, A.8. The CEO bonus level b is given 
exogenously in this section as well, because the main finding of this paper is unaffected 5
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even if it is treated endogenously. (That is, the monitoring level, p, is the same for both 
endogenously determined b and exogenously given b.)11
First stage - The board and incumbent CEO Nash bargain over a new director to 
be appointed to the board (monitoring level), and CEO wage level w: 
When a new member is appointed to the board, the new board will have a different 
measure of monitoring cost (precisely, by measuring how independent the board is from 
the incumbent CEO) from the incumbent board whose measure of monitoring cost is 
denoted k0.12  The new board’s measure of monitoring cost is denoted k1. All incumbent 
directors except the one who is going to leave the board (e.g. by retirement) participate 
in the negotiation.13 They act as one player that maximises its pay-off in the next stage 
onwards. The board needs to keep its size at n, and thus, remaining directors and the CEO 
determine who to hire to refill the vacancy in the management group.14  The ability of the 
incumbent CEO is either high (H) or low (L). I assume that the incumbent CEO’s priors 
are  1/ 2 γ >  for being H. This CEO is assumed to have acquired firm-specific knowledge 
during the trial period before Nash bargaining stage.15 The priors for any CEO potentials 
are assumed to be precisely 1/ 2 for both H and L. If there is a breakdown in negotiations, 
I assume the incumbent CEO is dismissed and the board hires a new CEO. Since prior 
beliefs on the ability of any CEO candidates are 1/ 2 for H and L, the new CEO does not 
have any bargaining power. Therefore, I assume that if the negotiation breaks down, the 
initial board pays the starting bonus to the new CEO, and also determines a new direc-
tor to be appointed to the board. This is done by maximising the expected pay-off of the 
board assuring at least the reservation utility of the newly hired CEO.
Second stage - The CEO is monitored by the new board and the board updates its 
assessment of CEO ability: 
The monitoring level is expressed as  [0,1] p∈ . It is interpreted as the probability of suc-
ceeding in getting informative indication about the ability of the CEO. That is, with prob-
ability p the board obtains an informative indication about the incumbent CEO’s ability. 
The informative information is expressed as { , } H L y Y y y ∈ = . The board believes the 
incumbent CEO is likely to be high-skilled if it obtains  H y , and it believes the incumbent 
CEO is likely to be low-skilled if it obtains  L y . With probability 1-p the board does not 
obtain informative indication. The board disutility of monitoring is expressed as  1 ( ) k d p ⋅
. (This is explained in section 2.2.2)6
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
Third stage - The new board decides to retain the incumbent CEO, or fire him/her 
and hire a new CEO: 
The same board as in stage two decides to retain or rehire the incumbent CEO depend-
ing on the information. With probability p the board observes either  H y (observed with 
probability q), or  L y (with probability 1-q). The board retains the incumbent CEO if it 
observes  H y , but fires if it observes  L y . When the incumbent CEO is fired, a new CEO 
is hired. With probability 1-p,the board has no reason to fire the incumbent CEO, and 
thus retains the incumbent CEO.
Fourth stage - Payouts are made and outcomes are realised: 
The firm’s profit is a random variable denoted by   dependent on the ability of the CEO. I 
denote by X the realised profit which belongs to { , } H L X X  where   . The board 
receives x from X, specifically  X x ρ =  where ρ  is exogenously given and is  (0,1) ρ ∈
. Each director receives  / x n  as a payment. If the incumbent CEO is retained to this last 
stage, s/he receives not only w, but also a bonus of   If the incumbent CEO was 
fired prior to this stage, the new CEO who is serving at this stage receives the starting 
bonus. Thus, all the players including the newcomer (a new CEO under the A-system; a 
new director under the J-system), collect their money.16
2.2 Players’ Problems
2.2.1 The incumbent CEO’s Problem
The incumbent CEO’s objectives are the same for both J-system and A-system. The ex-
pected utility of the incumbent CEO is expressed as:
1 1 [ ( ) (1 ( ))] , w p k z p k b + + −                       (1)
where the first term w is the wage and the second term is the bonus which s/he receives 
with probability  1 1 [ ( ) (1- ( ))] p k z p k + . This probability is the chance of the incumbent 
CEO being retained after being monitored by the board. Specifically, with probability 
p(k1,) the board obtains an informative indication from reviewing this CEO’s conduct 
(‘monitoring’), and with probability q, the board sees this CEO to be high-skilled. The 
probability the board does not obtain any informative indication regarding the CEO’s 
ability is (1 –  I show in Proposition One that the monitoring level p is a function of a 
measure of the new board’s lack of independence k1, and thus denoted as p(k1).7
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2.2.2 The Board’s Problem
The board’s problem is different between A-system and J-system, because under the latter 
system, all the incumbent directors are equally given a chance to become the succeeding 
CEO himself. Other than this, the board’s objectives are similar for both A-system and 
J-system.17
  The A-system
The board’s objective under the A-system is to maximise the expected profit of the firm, 
less the cost of monitoring, the wage to the incumbent CEO, and either the bonus to the 
incumbent CEO, or a starting salary to the new CEO.
1 1 1
1 1 1
  ( ) [ (1- ) ] (1- ( )) - ( ( )) 
  - -[ ( ) (1- ( ))] - ( ) (1- ) .
A A H N A I m A
A A A A
p k zx z x p k x k d p k
w p k z p k b p k z s
Ω = ⋅ + + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅
          (2)
The first term of the above expression is the expected pay-off after obtaining an informa-
tive indication. That is, with probability pA(k1) the board obtains an informative indication 
about the incumbent CEO. With probability (1-z), the board observes yH and believes that 
the CEO is likely to be high-skilled. Hence the board retains this CEO who is expected to 
bring the expected pay-off xH. With probability (1-q), the board believes that the CEO is 
likely to be low-skilled. In this case, the board replaces the incumbent CEO and hires a new 
CEO who is expected to bring xN.. The second term is the pay-off after the board failed 
to obtain an informative indication, which occurs with probability (1-pA(k1)). Thus, the 
board has no reason to fire the incumbent CEO and the expected profit of the firm is then 
denoted as xI. The third term is the cost of monitoring. Disutility of monitoring is expressed 
as  ( ) m k d ⋅  : km is the measure of the board’s lack of independence and m is denoted either 
0 (the initial board at stage one), or 1 (the new board at stage two), and d is strictly 
increasing, strictly convex, twice continuously differentiable function. I assume interior 
solutions. That is,  '( ) 0 d p →  as p  and  '( ) d p → ∞ as p where  [0,1] p∈ . The 
fourth term is the wage it must pay to the incumbent CEO. The fifth term is the bonus 
to the incumbent CEO which will be paid with probability  1 1 [ ( ) (1 ( )]. A A p k z p k ⋅ + −  
The sixth term is a starting bonus b the board will pay to the new CEO with probability 
1 ( ) (1 ) A p k z ⋅ − . The starting bonus b is given exogenous, because the firms usually fol-
low the amount determined in the market for the new CEO’s starting bonus. (As noted 
above, even if this is endogenously determined, the logic found in this paper is the same.) 
After the CEO acquires some firm-specific knowledge, then the CEO negotiates his/her 
wage as in this model. The utility  A Ω  is concave in  A p .8
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  The J-system




( ) (1 )( ) (1 ( ))
( ( )) .
J J H N J I
m J J
n
p k zx z x b p k x
n
k d p k w b
−   Ω = + − + + −    
− ⋅ − −
(3)
The difference from that of the A-system comes from the real-world practice that CEOs are 
internally promoted from the board members. This is reflected in the first term. Specifically, 
yH is obtained with probability z, and then the expected profit is xH. When yL is observed 
with probability (1-q), then the incumbent CEO is fired; then, one of the board members 
becomes a new CEO and receives b, and the remaining  1 n−  directors receive 
N x
n . Thus, 







+ . (Recall that the number of the directors is main-
tained at n: if the board dismisses the incumbent CEO, one of the directors becomes the 
new CEO. To maintain the board size, usually a low-ranking employee is promoted to a 
new director. This new director also receives  N x  in the last stage, but this is not reflected 
in (3), for the board members are not internalising his/her welfare.) The fifth term b, is 
the starting bonus given to the new CEO (who was a director before succeeding the post 
of CEO). The amount of starting bonus for the new CEO under the J-system is equivalent 
to the amount determined as a bonus for the incumbent CEO, because this new CEO was 
formally one of the directors who was participating in Nash bargaining. Other terms are 
as (2). The relations between the expected profit and the information are induced by the 
Bayes’ update. The profit is induced as  > >x > H I N L x x x  and   >x > H I L N x x x > .
3 The A-System
3.1 The Expected Pay-off of the Board
The utility for the board under the A-system at stage two (that is, (2) with m=1) is ex-
pressed as
1     [ (1 ) ] (1 ) - ( ) 
                        [ (1 )] (1 ) .
A A H N A I A
A A A A
p zx z x p x k d p
w p z p b p z s
Ω = + − + − ⋅
− − ⋅ + − − ⋅ −               (4)
The board chooses the monitoring level so as to maximise  A Ω . Thus, the first-order 
condition with respect to pA is
1 (1 ) '( ) ( 1) (1 ) 0.
A
H N I A
A
z x z x x k d p z b z s
p
∂Ω
= ⋅ + − − − ⋅ − − − − =
∂
        (5)
The  above  expression  is  sufficient  as  well  as  necessary.  Define  1 ( ) A p k   to 9
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be  the  solution  to  (5).  Furthermore,  by  differentiating  (5)  with  re-
















.   
As a result, there is an inverse relationship between the level of monitoring p and the new 
board measure of monitoring cost k1,which establishes:
Proposition 1 Where the new board consists of directors who incur less monitoring 
cost, the intensity to which it monitors the CEO increases under the A-system.
Proposition One implies that when the incumbent executives decide the new director to 
be appointed to the board in the first stage, it can be considered that they are deciding 
the monitoring level of the new board.
3.2 Nash Bargaining
The board and the CEO choose the optimum 
*
1 k and 
*
A w to maximise the following 
Nash product:
{ } 1 1
1 1
0 1 1 1 1
[ ( ) (1 ( ))]
( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ( ))
.
( ( )) [ ( ) (1 ( ))] ( )(1 )
A A A A C
A H N A I
A A A A A A
V p k z p k b w
p k z x z x p k x
k d p k w p k z p k b p k z s
θ
θ
= ⋅ + − + −
⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ + −  
×  − ⋅ − − ⋅ + − − − −  
   (6)
Recall that Nash bargaining stage is at stage one, so the players are the incumbent CEO 
and the initial board whose measure of monitoring cost is k0. After the bargaining, the 
board member change due to the turn-over of directors, and this new board’s measure of 
monitoring cost is expressed as k1. In other words, the board that decides the new board 
composition and the board that later monitors the CEO is different. This is the reason 
why the third term in the second bracket is expressed as  0 1 ( ( )) A k d p k ⋅ . The reservation 
utility of the CEO and the board are denoted as    and  C A θ θ  respectively.  A θ  is the ex-
pected pay-off of the board if it hires a replacement CEO. The board’s reservation utility 
A θ , is in the Appendix A.1.  C θ  equals s, which is the starting salary of any outside CEO. 
The threat point is in the interior of the feasible set, so they enter into negotiation. The 
proof is in the Appendix A.2. I define the solution for Max V A as 
*
1 k and 
*
A w . Then the 
monitoring level is denoted as 
*
1 ( ) A p k , and establishes:







'( ( )) (1 ) (1 ) . A H N I d p k zx z x x z s
k
= + − − − −                                                (7)
The implication of Proposition Two is that the level of monitoring pA is negatively related 10
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to s under the A-system. That is, the higher the starting bonus of the new CEO, the less 
the board monitors under the A-system. The last term (1- z)s is a fraction of the Nash 
bargaining surplus that is given to the newcomer who did not exist when the negotia-
tion was taking place. Thus, the larger s, the more distortion in the expected bargaining 
surplus which should be divided among the executives who participate in the negotiation. 
To minimise this distortion caused by the transfer of expected surplus to the newcomer, 
the board reduces the monitoring level to keep the incumbent CEO in place. The proof 
of this Proposition is in the Appendix A.3.
4 The J-System
4.1 The Expected Pay-off of the Board
The utility of the J-system at stage two (that is, (3) with m=1) is expressed as:
1
1
(1 )( ) (1 ) ( ) . J J H N J I J J
n
p zx z x b p x k d p w b
n
−   Ω = + − + + − − ⋅ − −     (8)
The optimum level of monitoring is derived by the first-order condition with respect to 




(1 )( ) '( ) 0.
J
H N I J
J
n
z x z x b x k d p
p n
∂Ω −
= ⋅ + − + − − ⋅ =
Ω
                         (9)
The above expression is sufficient as well as necessary. Define  1 ( ) J p k  to be the solution to 
(9). Furthermore, similar to the A-system, it can be shown that k1 and p have an inverse 
relationship by differentiating (9) with respect to k1. This leads to:
Proposition 3 (Analogous to Proposition One) Where the new board consists of 
directors who incur less monitoring cost, the intensity to which it monitors the CEO 
increases under the J-system.
Similar to Proposition One, Proposition Three implies that when the board and the in-
cumbent CEO decide on a new director to be appointed to the board as a first stage, it 
can be treated as if they are deciding the monitoring level of the new board.
4.2 Nash Bargaining
When the incumbent CEO and the board enter into negotiation, they choose 
*
1 k  and 
*
J w  to maximise11
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[ ] { } 1 1
1 1 0 1
( ) (1 ( ))
1
( ) (1 )( ) (1 ( )) ( ( )) .
J J J J C
J H N J I J J J
V p k z p k b w
n




= ⋅ + − + −
 −    × ⋅ + − + + − − ⋅ − − −        
        (10)
The reservation utility of the Japanese board is expressed as  J θ , and this is the expected 
pay-off if the board hires a replacement CEO. The reservation utility  J θ , is in the Ap-
pendix A 4. Again, the reservation utility for the CEO is s, that is  . C s θ = 18 The threat 
point is in the interior of the feasible set so they enter into negotiation. The proof is in the 
Appendix A 5. I denote 
*
1 k  and 
*
J w  to be the solution to Max VJ. Then the monitoring 
level is denoted as 
*
1 ( ) J p k  which establishes:
Proposition 4 Where the equilibrium level of monitoring for the J-system is 





'( ( )) (1 ) (1 ) . J H N I N d p k zx z x x z x
k n
  = + − − − −    
                                      (11)
The implication of Proposition Four is that the number of directors and the monitoring 
level are positively related. That is, the larger the size of the board, the more the board 
monitors under the J-system. The proof of this Proposition is in the Appendix A.6. Under 
the J-system, when the incumbent CEO is fired, one of the directors becomes the next 
CEO and one of the long term employees is promoted to a directorship. This implies, 
with probability (1–z), a share of  / N x n  from the whole board pay-off xN, will be paid 
to the new director (who is the ‘newcomer’). This payment to the new director is the 
cause of distortion of Nash bargaining surplus which would be divided only by the two 
negotiating players if there were no CEO replacement. Thus, the smaller n, the larger the 
fraction of bargaining surplus to be transferred to the newcomer, and hence the board 
acts to decrease the monitoring level to increase the probability that the incumbent CEO 
is kept in place.
  Proposition Four implies that as a system, the J-system can function as a monitoring 
device. Traditionally, Japanese companies tend to have larger boards than US companies, 
but because of the other problems caused by having large boards, some companies are 
run inefficiently. Many lawyers, policy makers, and economists have attributed the cause 
of inefficiency to oversized boards, but Proposition Four proves that this is not always 
true.
  Proposition Four suggests that if companies wish to raise monitoring levels, the size 
of the board n should be increased in order to minimise distortion under the J-system. 
Although increasing the number of the directors induces the Japanese board to produce 
strong monitoring in the model, in practice it incurs some costs that are not discussed 
in the model. For example, it could slow down the decision-making of the board, and it 12
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could render each director’s conduct obscure. More importantly, although increase in n 
reduces the distortion of the Nash bargaining surplus, it may reduce the amount of salary 
each director receives as well. However, since the increase in monitoring levels raises the 
corporate value X, the amount each director receives may not decrease as compared to 
the case where n is small, if the marginal increase in X is larger enough.19 Increasing the 
number of directors may incur some other problems, such as free rider problems. I also 
show in the Appendix A 8, that if  () d ⋅  is a function of n, the Japanese board becomes 
inefficiently oversized. However, whether n is determined endogenously in the model or 
given exogenously to the model do not affect the monitoring level p. 
  Furthermore, Proposition Four gives an insight into the recent legislation in Japan. 
In 2002 the Japanese Commercial Codes were amended to give some companies a choice of 
governance structure of the traditional Japanese system or the new Japanese system referred 
to as Companies with Committees.20 The new system encourages companies to have smaller 
boards with committees comprised of a majority of outside directors. However, not only 
those companies that chose to adopt the new system, but also the companies who chose 
to stick with the traditional system are reducing the number of directors as well. They are 
decreasing the number of directors but instead have created a special post of corporate 
officers, who do not legally serve on the board but do receive a certain amount of share of 
profits of the firm, just as other directors do.21 This implies the recent practice in Japanese 
firms to reduce the number of directors may render board’s weak monitoring device. The 
proof is in Appendix A 7. Compensating those who are deprived of a director’s post with a 
new post as corporate officers does not induce the board to produce stronger monitoring. 
This is because the effect of distortion to each incumbent player becomes larger. Therefore, 
the level of monitoring may become worse. Increasing the number of directors incurs some 
trade-offs as argued in the above paragraph, but I emphasise that reducing the directors 
and creating a post of corporate officer is not a sensible policy either.
  Lastly, there is a way to avoid distortion under the J-system. Those companies that 
wish to do so should not fill the vacancy caused on the board by promoting an employee 
to a directorship. To be more specific, the vacancy is derived from a promotion of one of 
the incumbent directors to be the new CEO after the incumbent CEO was hired. This 
means that, even if the incumbent CEO were deprived of his/her title as CEO, if s/he 
could serve on the board as one of the inside directors to fill in the vacancy, there will be 
no distortion in the distribution of bargaining surplus. As mentioned earlier, in Japanese 
practice, retired CEOs usually remain in the company anyway. They may be given a special 
title, such as advisor, but not belong to management or the board. Since a retired CEO is 
not forbidden to serve on the board, it would be more efficient if s/he were given a post 
as one of the inside directors rather than an advisor, so that vacancy created to the board 13
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would not be filled with non-incumbent members.
  Next, I compare the level of monitoring between the A-system and the J-system 






< , that is, the amount of starting salary to the new CEO is smaller than 
the amount of salary to the new director, then the A-system produces stronger monitoring 
than the J-system. Then for all levels of monitoring cost k1, the board of the
A-system monitors the incumbent CEO more intensely than the board of the J-system;
1 1 ( ) ( ) A J p k p k > . Suppose next,  1
N s x
n
> , then for all levels of measure of monitoring 
cost k1, the opposite is true;  1 1 ( ) ( ) J A p k p k > .




< , it 
is less costly for the board of the A-system to monitor the CEO as compared to the board 
of the J-system; 
* *
1 1




> , the board of the A-system incurs more cost 
in monitoring as compared to the board of the J-system; 
* *
1 1
A J k k > .
3. Thus, when  1
N s x
n
<  holds, the A-system produces far more intensive monitoring 
than the J-system; 
* *
1 1 ( ) ( )
A J




>  holds, the J-system produces 
far more intensive monitoring than the A-system; 
* *
1 1 ( ) ( )
J A
J A p k p k > .
Proof. 
1: Second stage
Recall  '( ) 0 d p > . Then, by comparing (5) and (9), and holding fixed  1 k  of both A-system 











1 k  may be the same level in both systems, but usually they are different. In the A-system, 
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+ − − − −  
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< , the opposite is true.14






>  holds, from (7) and (11), the J-system produces far more intensive 




<  holds, the A-system produces far more 
intensive monitoring than the J-system.
  Proposition Five has two important implications. First, the board under the J-sys-
tem may produce stronger monitoring than the board under the A-system. Propositions 
Two and Four prove that board has intrinsic weakness in monitoring the CEO. That is, 
when the incumbent CEO has the power to negotiate with the board a new director to 
be appointed to the board (which affects the monitoring levels), there will be distortion of 
Nash bargaining surplus which both negotiating parties wish to minimise. The monitoring 
level determined by two players who wish to share the surplus only by themselves thus 
sometimes departs from the optimum monitoring level.
  Moreover, the amount of distortion is determined by whom they have for CEO 
succession candidates in both corporate governance systems. Hence, if a company wishes 
to strengthen the board monitoring, it should appoint the new CEO from inside the in-








<  holds. 
 
  Second, Proposition Five explains one of the reasons why some Japanese companies 
are claimed to produce inefficient monitoring even when they have large boards (that is 
large n in this paper). It is shown in Propositions Two, Four, and Five that as a system, 
the J-system functions as well as the A-system. However, the difference comes from the 
parameter  0 k , which is the measure of monitoring costs for the incumbent board, and is 
exogenously given and treated as equal in both A-system and J-system. In practice, they are 
not the same. When  0 k  is the same in both systems, the right-hand sides of (7) and (11) 




. However, if  0 k  is different between 
two systems, the right-hand sides of both equations are not that simply compared. Specifi-
cally,  0 k  is likely to be much larger in Japan. One of the reasons is that strong personal 
relations have been created between the CEO and the board in Japanese firms where the 
board traditionally consists of long- term employees who were promoted to directors not 
just by their ability but also by seniority. This has a psychological effect on the Japanese 
directors and in the model it can be interpreted as higher  0 k  as compared to that of the 
A-system. Given these facts, I show how the difference in  0 k  affects the monitoring lev-




> . From Proposition Five, if  0 k  is fixed at the 
same level, (7) >(11) holds, which suggests it is more costly for the board of the A-system 
to monitor the CEO. However, if  0 k  of the J-system is larger than that of the A-system, 
this inequality may reverse. That is, even if (11) <(7) holds, the J-system may yield weak 15
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< . In this case, it is obvious that if 
0 k  in the J-system is large, what is provided in Proposition Five is even more stressed. 
This is why it is perceived by many that the boards of the J-system produce relatively weak 
monitoring. 
  Therefore, the way to make the boards under the J-system work as a strong moni-
toring device without increasing n is to adopt outside directors who are independent of 
the CEO, so that their presence on the board would lower the level of  0 k . Note that 
internally promoting a director to the position of CEO and internally promoting a low 
ranking employee to a position of directorship must be distinguished. This paper has shown 
that the J-system (a system in which CEOs are chosen from the incumbent directors) may 
produce more monitoring than the A-system (a system in which CEOs are recruited from 
outside the board). However, it is shown in Proposition Five that internal promotion of a 
low-ranking employee to directorship causes the board monitoring to be weak under the 
J-system.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I compare two corporate governance systems for monitoring CEOs; the 
A-system and the J-system. In the former system, I assume the CEO is always recruited 
from outside the board. In the latter system, the CEO is always internally promoted. In 
addition to the assumption that the board is composed entirely of inside directors, which 
is common in Japanese practice, the CEO is elected from the board of directors, and hence 
in the model the channel to become CEO in traditional Japanese companies is through 
the board of directors. I show that when the incumbent CEO and the board negotiate 
over topics that affect monitoring level (for example, a new director to be appointed to the 
board), such negotiations exhibit distortion in the distribution of bargaining surplus, and 
hence board monitoring becomes weak regardless of the governance system. However, I 
show that the equilibrium monitoring level may become higher under the J-system than 
under the A-system, because under a system in which the CEO is internally promoted 
from inside directors, there is less distortion of bargaining surplus to be divided by the 
negotiating parties. I also argue that board monitoring of CEOs under the J-system can 
be strengthened by appointing independent directors rather than internally promoting a 
successful low ranking employee to the position of directorship. 16
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Appendix
A 1. The threat point of the board under the A-system






[ (1 ) ] (1 ) ( )
[ (1 )] (1 ) ,
A A NH N A N A A
A A A
p q x q x p x w k d p
p q p b p q s
θ = ⋅ + − + − − ⋅
+ − − ⋅ − −
−
 
         (14)
where 
*
0A p  is the optimum level of monitoring chosen by the board when its meas-
ure of monitoring cost is  1 k
 , and hence 
*
0A p  is a function of  1 k
 . The first term 
*
0 [ (1 ) ] A NH N p q x q x ⋅ + −  is the expected pay-off when the board obtains an informative 
information about CEO ability: with probability q the new CEO is retained and the profit 
that is stochastic to his/her ability is xNH but with probability (1 - q), the new CEO is 
fired and another new CEO is hired, and hence the profit that is determined stochastically 
to the CEO’s ability is xN. The second term  0
* (1 ) A N p x −  is the pay-off when the board 
obtains no informative information and hence the new CEO is retained.
Hence the profit is xN. The wage  A w
  equals 
* *
0 0 [ (1 )]
A A s p q p b − + − ⋅
 , because the 
incumbent board alone decides the wage, subject to at least guaranteeing the reservation 
utility of the newly hired CEO. The new director is also appointed by the board alone. 17
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The fourth term,  0 0
* ( ) A k d p ⋅
  is the cost of monitoring. The fifth term is the bonus to 
the CEO. The last term is the starting bonus for a new CEO who will be appointed if the 
CEO in place is fired. I assume z>q.
A 2. Proof of participation constraint for the negotiation under the A-
system 
The addition of the threat points for the board and the CEO is
0 ( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ,  A NH N N T p p q x q x p x k d p p q s = ⋅ + − + − − ⋅ − −         (15)
for  [ (1 )] s w p q p b = + ⋅ + − .
The addition of (1) and (2) is
0 ( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) ( ) (1 ) .                        (16)  A H N I G p p z x z x p x k d p p z s = ⋅ + − + − − ⋅ − −          (16)
It is assumed that z>q, and hence (15) < (16) if p is the same. Hence, if we denote by 
*
0 p  
the level of monitoring that maximises (15), and plug this into both (15) and (16), then, 
* *
0 0 ( ) ( ) A A T p G p <  holds. Denote the monitoring level that maximises (16) as 
*
A p . Then 
* *
0 ( ) ( ) A A A G p G p <  holds. Therefore, 
* *
0 ( ) ( ) A A A T p G p < holds and the feasible set is in 
the interior of the addition of the players’ utilities. 
Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2: (7)
The first-order condition maximizing VA with respect to k1 yields
{ }
{ }




( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ( )) - ( ( ))
[ ( ) (1 ( ))] ( ) (1 )
( 1)
[ ( ) (1 ( ))]
(1 ) '( ( )) ( 1) (1 )
0.
A H N A I A
A A A A A
A A A C
H N I A
p k zx z x p k x k d p k
w p k z p k b p k z s
z b
p k z p k b w
zx z x x k d p k z b z s
θ
θ
⋅ + − + − ⋅  
  − − ⋅ + − − ⋅ − −  
× −
+ ⋅ + − + −
× + − − − ⋅ − − − −
=
          (17)
The first-order condition maximizing V A with respect to wA yields
1 1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1
 { ( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ( )) - ( ( ))
[ ( ) (1 ( ))] ( ) (1 ) }
 {[ ( ) (1 ( ))] }
 0.
A H N A I A
A A A A A
A A A C
p k z x z x p k x k d p k
w p k z p k b p k z s
p k z p k b w
θ
θ
⋅ ⋅ + − + − ⋅
− − ⋅ + − − ⋅ − −
− ⋅ + − + −
=
          (18)
Notice that the first term of (18) equals the first term of (17). Thus, substituting (18) into 
(17) and solving for 
*







'( ( )) (1 ) (1 ) . A H N I d p k zx z x x z s
k
= + − − − −
Q.E.D.18
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A 4. The threat point of the board under the J-system








( 1) (1 )




J J J N J J
N
J J J J
x n n
p q n b w p q x b w
n n n
x
p n b w w b k d p
n
θ
  − −   = − + + + − + +        
  + − − + + − − − ⋅    
⋅ ⋅
   
   
   (19)
where 
*
0J p  is the optimum level of monitoring chosen by the board when its measure of 
monitoring cost is  1 k
 , and hence 
*
0J p  is a function of  1 k
 . The first and the second terms 
are the expected pay-offs of the board when the new CEO is internally promoted after the 
breakdown of negotiation. (Recall that under the J-system, when the negotiation breaks 
down in the first stage the board fires the incumbent CEO and one of the incumbent 
directors becomes the new CEO.)







p q n b w
n
 ⋅  − + +    
   is the expected pay-off to the incumbent board 
members when the informative information about new CEO ability is obtained through 
monitoring and the board believes that the new CEO is high-skilled and thus retains 
him/her. The third term 
*





p n b w
n
  − − + +    
   is the expected pay-off when the 
board obtains no informative information about the new CEO ability and hence has no 
choice but to retain him/her. When the board retains this new CEO after either obtaining 
an informative information (the first term), or not obtaining any informative information 
(the third term), there will be no further changes in the board members. Therefore, at the 
point of Nash bargaining in the first stage (on-the-path), the incumbent directors know 
that if the bargaining breaks down one of themselves will receive   and  J J b w
  , and the 
remaining n-1 directors will receive either  , or  .
NH N x x
n n
 
The second term is the expected pay-off when the board believes this new CEO is low-
skilled as a result of monitoring and hence fires him/her and promotes another director 
to the post of CEO (which will be the second CEO in the off-the-path). Note that this 
second new CEO could be either one of the initial directors who was participating in the 
Nash bargaining, or the director who was newly appointed to the board to fill in the vacancy 
caused by the first CEO replacement. If it is the latter case, then, the first new CEO (the 
one promoted after the initial incumbent CEO was fired) receives  J w
 , and the second 
new CEO (the one promoted after the first new CEO was fired) receives  J b
 22 Thus, it 
is with probability  1 n
n
− that n incumbent directors receive  J b
 . The expected pay-off to 
the incumbent members who were not promoted to the post of CEO is as follows: if the 
newly-hired director becomes a CEO with probability of 
1
n
, the remaining incumbent 




, but if one of the remaining incumbent directors becomes a CEO 
with probability  1 n
n
− , one of them receives  J b




wage  J w
  will be paid to the CEO in position, so one of the incumbent directors receives 
this. Therefore, the expected pay-off is expressed as 
2
2
1 1 ( 1) 1
( 1) ( 2)   .
N N
J J N J J
x x n n n
n b n w x b w
n n n n n n
  − − −     − + + − + = + +            
   
The fourth term is the wage  J w
 and this equals 
* *
0 0 [ (1 )]
J J J s p q p b ⋅ − + −
 , because the 
incumbent board alone decides the wage as to maximise its expected pay-off subject to at 
least assuring the reservation utility of the newly-hired CEO. The board also appoints a 
new director by itself. The last term is the cost of monitoring.
A 5. Proof of participation constraint for the negotiation in the J-
system 





( )  ( -1) (1 )





T p p q n b p q x b
n n n
x
p n b b k d p s
n
  −   = ⋅ + + ⋅ − +        
  + − − + − − ⋅ +    
        (20)




( ) (1 ) (1 )( )




G p p z p b p z x z x b
n
p x k d p b
−   = ⋅ + − + ⋅ + − +    
+ − − ⋅ −
          (21)
It is assumed that z>q, and hence (20) < (21) holds if p is the same in both expressions. (First, 
organise all the terms that have b into one term, and then compare them between (20) and 
(21). Hence, if we denote by
*
0 p , the level of monitoring that maximises (20), and plug 
this into both (20) and (21), 
*
0 0
* ( ) ( ) J J T p G p <  holds. Denote the level of monitoring 
that maximises (21) as 
*
J p then 
*
0
* ( ) ( ) J J J G p G p <  holds. Therefore, 
*
0
* ( ) ( ) J J J T p G p <  
holds and the feasible set is in the interior of the addition of the player’s utilities.
Q.E.D.
A 6. Proof of Proposition 4: (11)
The first-order condition maximizing VJ with respect to  1 k yields,
{ }




( ) (1 )( ) (1 ( )) ( ( ))
( 1)
[ ( ) (1 ( ))]
1
(1 )( ) '( ( ))
0.
J H N J I J J J
J J J C
H N I J
n
p k zx z x b p k x k d p k w b
n
z b
p k z p k b w
n




 −    ⋅ + − + + − − ⋅ − − −        
× −
+ ⋅ + − + −
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The first-order condition maximizing VJ with respect to wJ yields,
1 1 0 1
1 1
1
  ( ) (1 )( ) (1 ( )) ( ( ))
 {[ ( ) (1 ( ))] }
 0.
J H N J I J J J
J J J C
n
p k zx z x b p k x k d p k w b
n
p k z p k b w
θ
θ
 −    ⋅ + − + + − − ⋅ − − −        
− ⋅ + − + −
=
  (23)         
Notice that the first terms of (22) and (23) are the same. Thus, substituting (23) into 
(22), and solving for 
*






'( ( )) (1 ) (1 )
N
J H N I
x
d p k z x z x x z
k n




A 7. Proof of ‘Corporate officers’ may weaken board monitoring
For simplicity, I assume that the number of directors is reduced to one-half. By reducing 
the number of board will reduce the profit of the firm, but does not reduce the amount 










'( ( )) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) J H N I N d p k zx z x x z x
k k n
= + − − − − . 
The first-term of the right-hand side decreases because xH, xN, xI  all become one-half, but 
the second term of the right-hand side, which causes the distortion of the Nash bargaining 
surplus remains the same.
Q.E.D.
A 8. Endogenously determining the size of the board, n. 
This section also shows that endogenising b does not affect the substantial result of the 
paper. To do so, I let p be the function of  1 k  and b. It is clear that taking first order con-
ditions to (25) and (28) with respect to b yields the same result as (7) and (11). Suppose 
the incumbent board and CEO negotiate over the size of the board. I let the disutility 
of monitoring to be the function of p (k1, b) and n, and hence it is expressed as d(p(k1, 
b), n).
I assume  () d ⋅  is a convex function in n, and there exists   where  () n d ⋅ is minimum given p 
and b. That is,  ( ,0) ( , )
0, and  0  for some   0.







Under the A-system, the board expected utility will be expressed as
1 1 1
1 1 1
( , ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ( , )) ( ( , ), )
[ ( , ) (1 ( , ))] ( , ) (1 ) .
A A H N A A I m A A
A A A A A A A A
p k b zx z x p k b x k d p k b n
w p k b z p k b b p k b z s
⋅ + − + − − ⋅
− − ⋅ + − − ⋅ −
          (24)
Then, the Nash product, V An is expressed as
{ }
1 1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1
( , ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ( , )) ( ( , ), )
[ ( , ) (1 ( , ))] ( , ) (1 )
[ ( , ) (1 ( , )]
A A H N A A I A A
A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A C
p k b zx z x p k b x k d p k b n
w p k b z p k b b p k b z s
p k b z p k b b w
θ
θ
⋅ + − + − − ⋅  
  − − ⋅ + − − ⋅ − −  
× ⋅ + − + −
        (25)
The first-order condition maximising V An with respect to n yields:
1
1 1 0
( ( , ), )
{[ ( , ) (1 ( , ))] } 0.
A A
A A A A A A C
d p k b n
p k b z p k b b w k
n
θ
∂   ⋅ + − + − − ⋅ =  
∂  
       (26)
Next, the board expected utility under the J-system is expressed as
1 1 1
1
( , ) (1 )( ) (1 ( , )) ( ( , ), ) . J J H N J J J I m J J J J
n
p k b zx z x b p k b x k d p k b n w b
n
−   ⋅ + − + + − − ⋅ − −    
      
(27)
Then, the Nash product VJn is expressed as
[ ] { }
1 1 0 1
1 1
1
( , ) (1 )( ) (1 ( , )) ( ( , ), )
( , ) (1 ( , ))
0.                                                                              
J J H N J J J I J J J J J
J J J J J J C
n
p k b zx z x b p k b x k d p k b n w b
n
p k b z p k b b w
θ
θ
 −    ⋅ + − + + − − ⋅ − − −        
× ⋅ + − + −
=                                                     
(28)
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The first term of both (26) and (29) are positive, and hence the second terms for both 
expressions equal 0.
That is, for the A-system,
1 ( ( , ), )
=0,




                       (30)
and for the J-system, 
2 1
1 0
( ( , ), )
( , ) (1 ) 0.
J J
J J N
d p k b n
p k b z x n k
n
− ∂
⋅ − − ⋅ =
∂
            (31)22
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From (30), the size of the board is determined at the optimum level under the A-sys-
tem.
However, from (31), the board size is determined at the level that is larger than the op-
timum under the J-system.
Also note that taking first order conditions to (25) and (28) with respect to b and w and 




1  The legislation passed in 2003 gives firms a choice of corporate governance; a traditional 
Japanese corporate governance or a new corporate governance referred to as companies with 
committees. The latter requires boards to have committees which are comprised of majority 
of outside directors. However, as of May 2009, only about hundred companies in Japan 
have switched to this governance system.
2  For example, boards of Canon, Nintendo, and Toyota are composed almost entirely of inside 
directors, majority of which have been working for over thirty years for the same company. 
(As of May, 2009)
3  Parrino [1997] classifies a succeeding CEO as an insider if s/he had been employed by the 
firm for more than one year before succeeding to the post of CEO.
4  It is also mandatory to concurrently hold posts of chairman of the board and CEO.
5  Currently, whether to mandate the presence of outside directors on Japanese corporate 
boards is discussed among the group of lawyers, economists, practitioners, and the politi-
cians.
6  The board updates the incumbent CEO’s ability by monitoring (e.g. reviewing his/her 
conduct).  Then, if it believes that the CEO has poor ability, the board will replace the CEO. 
Therefore, the purpose of the monitoring is to fire a substandard CEO and to hire a new 
CEO who is expected to increase the corporate profit. (The profit of the firm is dependent 
on the ability of the CEO in their model and also in this paper.) 
7  For simplicity, I assume that the outside directors have no incentive to succeed the post of 
CEO. This is because outside directors usually have other occupations, such as professor, 
and can be considered to have less incentive to become the CEO of the company which 
s/he works as outside director.
8  The level of monitoring is a measure of board’s lack of independency from the incumbent 
CEO as in Hermalin and Weisbach [1998]. The other way to interpret the level of moni-
toring is to consider it as the amount of cost the board is willing to incur in reviewing the 
CEO’s conduct.
9  In the long term, the board size may decrease, but in the short term, the board needs to 
keep a certain number of directors to keep its job operating.
10  There are both merits and demerits for CEOs hired from outside and promoted from inside 
the board. For example, outside CEO candidates may be management experts in the same 
industry and may be talented. However, they may not fit the culture of the company. On 
the other hand, insider CEO candidates may be very knowledgeable about their company, 
but at the same time, may not be able to make the necessary changes in management.
11  To endogenously treat b, the incumbent board and CEO may negotiate; a new director to 
be appointed, CEO wage level w, and CEO bonus level b in Nash bargaining. The distortion 
(which is the main finding of this paper) is measured by the amount which the newcomer(s) 
receive in place of negotiating parties, as shown in Propositions Two and Four. The CEO’s 
expected profit is expressed as w+(the probability of obtaining b)b. This is determined at 
unique level in the bargaining. This holds true for both endogenously treated b and ex-
ogenously treated b. Therefore, the level of monitoring, p, is not affected by whether b is 
endogenously determined or exogenously given. That is, whether b is treated endogenously 
or exogenously does not affect the main finding of this paper. See the Appendix A.8 for 
detail. What I am mentioning here is easily derived from Appendix A.8, where I model the 
players’ objectives with endogenous n.
12  Refilling the board after a reason which the incumbent board members have no controls 
(i.e. exogenous reasons such as retirement, death, and etc.) must be distinguished from 24
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
refilling the board after a reason which the incumbent members do have some influences 
(i.e. CEO replacement where the incumbent members have a choice to retain or fire the 
CEO).
13  The director who leaves the board at this stage due to retirement or any other exogenous 
reasons does not participate in Nash bargaining, and thus, at Nash bargaining stage, there 
will be n-1 directors. However, when the board and incumbent CEO Nash bargain, the 
board objective is considered as that of n directors. Nash bargaining solution is unique up 
to Affine transformation, and therefore, whether there are n or n-1 directors on the board 
does not affect the result. 
14  In this model, if m directors are retiring, m new directors will be appointed. This is because, 
in the long term, the board size may decrease, but in the short term, the board needs to 
keep a certain number of directors to keep its job operating.
15  I assume  1/ 2 γ >  to drop the first three stages (before the Nash bargaining stage) as pro-
vided in Hermalin and Weisbach [1998]. The interpretation of the fist three stages in their 
model could be the trial period, where they hire a new CEO whose ability is no different 
from any other CEO candidates. They let the board do the first update on the ability of this 
CEO before proceeding to Nash bargaining to give a bargaining power to the incumbent 
CEO, but this process can be shortened by assuming  1/ 2. γ >
16  To be more precise, under the A-system, the new CEO (who is a newcomer) who was 
recruited from outside the board receives a starting bonus. Under the J-system, the new 
CEO who was promoted from inside the board receives a starting bonus, and a new director 
(who is a newcomer) who was promoted to the board receives a pay as a director. 
17  Note that if we assume that ‘hats’ above the variables indicate per-person level, then   x nx = , 
 d nd = and   w nw =  hold. As noted in footnote 13, Nash bargaining solution is unique up 
to Affine transformation.
18  In  Japanese  practice,  when  a  CEO  resigns  without  causing  serious  damage 
while  on  duty,  s/he  is  often  given  an  alternative  post  in  the  company.  Un-
der  the  current  law,  s/he  may  become  one  of  the  inside  directors  and  remain 
on  the  board,  or  s/he  may  be  given  a  post  out  of  the  board,  such  as  an  advisor. 
See  the  Supreme  Court  decision  of  20  Dec,  1966,  20-10,  min-syu,  2160. 
In such cases, the reservation utility of the incumbent CEO is more than s. When the CEO 
remains on the board, his/her reservation utility becomes that of the directors, but when s/he 
becomes an advisor, s/he receives some fixed amount. To discuss the former case, another 
model is required, but it is more natural in practice that once a CEO has resigned, s/he 
either leaves the company or is given a post out of the board (e.g. an advisor). Therefore, it 
is innocuous to assume that the reservation utility for the CEO is s for simplicity.
19  The problem that may arise if the amount of pay each director receives becomes low is that 
directors may try to increase their payments in a different way. For example, directors might 
raise the fraction of the share the board receives from the corporate profit X. That is, in this 
model, the board might raise ρ ; which would leave the amount of (1 )X ρ − small, and may 
decrease the amount shareholders receive. Given all these arguments, in practice, the cost 
of increasing n is not trivial and it may not be easy to increase the number of directors.
20  Sutoh and Takehara [2007] finds no evidence that the company with committees system 
produces more monitoring than the traditional J-system.
21  Corporate officers referred to as Shikko-yakuin are neither director nor CEO. Their primary 
job is said to be executing the decisions made by the board of directors. Interested readers 
are referred to Sarra and Nakahigashi [2002].
22  With probability  1
(1 ) ,     J p q b
n
−
  will be given to this ‘newcomer’ to the board.25
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